DevelopmentalPsychologyintheContextofOtherBehavioralSciences.pdf
Developmental Psychology1992, W. 28, No. 6,1018-1029
Copyright 1992 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.0012-1649/92/13.00
Developmental Psychology in the Context of Other Behavioral Sciences
Robert A. HindeSt John's College, Cambridge
and Medical Research Council Group on the Development and Integration of BehaviourMadingley, Cambridge, United Kingdom
Certain characteristics of psychology that have been instrumental to its success, such as emphaseson an experimental approach, on group means, on theory-driven research, and on analysis but notsynthesis, can be detrimental to progress if taken too far. In addition, psychology's success has ledto its fragmentation into subdisciplines, with too little cross-fertilization. Future progress maydepend on a focus not only on individuals, but also on individuals in a network of social relation-ships whose course is influenced by social norms and values. In this connection, it is helpful todistinguish a number of levels of social complexity and to come to terms with the dialecticalrelations between them. We must pay more attention to description as a first stage in the analysis ofprocess, recognizing that description can never be perfect and that it must embrace the severallevels of social complexity. We must also come to terms with the relations between the several levelsof complexity, and thus between the several subdisciplines appropriate to them. This multidisci-plinary approach can be based on a study of relatively stable human behavioral characteristics andmust include the relations among individuals, relationships, and culture. Some pointers can befound in a judiciously used evolutionary approach.
A centenary is a time to look back, to see how much has beenachieved in the preceding decades. But the enormous progressmade by developmental psychology hardly needs underlining,and self-congratulatory backslapping would be out of place in ajournal to be read by developmental psychologists. A centen-ary is also a time to look forward, to assess the present con-straints on further progress and ask how they can be overcome.Let us then start with some gross generalizations, not because Ibelieve for a moment that they are without exceptions, but be-cause they help focus attention on some current problems indevelopmental psychology.
In its early days, psychology needed to establish itself as adistinct discipline and to achieve recognition as a respectablebranch of science. It achieved distinctiveness from biology/phy-siology by focusing on the psyche, and from philosophy pri-marily by adopting an experimental approach. It achieved re-spectability by attempting to ape physics—again by the use ofthe experimental method—and also by attempting a hypothe-tico-deductive approach, by an emphasis on objectivity, andalso by the use of statistical tools.
Each of these, taken too far, has brought problems. A focuson the psyche came into conflict with pressures to study behav-ior objectively, which in turn led to a neglect of process. Anoveremphasis on an experimental approach led to an underem-phasis on people in the real world and to single-variable studies.
I am grateful to Patrick Bateson (1991) for editing a series of essaysthat brought together many of the issues discussed in this article, andto him, John Fentress, and Joan Stevenson-Hinde for comments on anearlier draft of the article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Rob-ert A. Hinde, The Master's Lodge, St. John's College, Cambridge CB21TP, United Kingdom.
Attempts to ape physics led to an underestimation of the im-portance of description: much of classical physics dealt witheveryday events for whose analysis description was unneces-sary, but the complexity of human behavior demands an initialdescriptive phase.
The undervaluing of description led also to a belief that re-search should always be theory-driven. This is fair enough if notoverstated, but it can lead to an unwillingness to allow the datato suggest problems. During the forties and fifties, a hypothe-tico-deductive approach led to a particularly narrow, theory-driven approach, with a focus on limited experimental situa-tions. Although theory-driven research is often a first priority,important advances can also follow if novel phenomena areseized and studied with the best tools available. Examples areprovided by Bowlby's (e.g., 1969) following up of the findingthat disturbed adolescents had had major and repeated separa-tion experiences in childhood, Andrew's (1991) discovery ofthe effects of testosterone on the persistence of motor patternsand the duration for which events are held in the working mem-ory, or Horn's (1985, 1991) discovery of asymmetries in brainfunction in chicks. Finally, an overemphasis on statistics canlead to a focus on group means with a neglect of individualdifferences.
These caveats are not intended to play down in any way theextraordinary progress made by psychology in general or bydevelopmental psychology in particular. But a retrospectiveview and a recognition of past constraints can warn usof futuredangers. And there is one further issue that is a direct result ofpsychology's success: its fragmentation into subdisciplines. De-velopmental psychology has, properly, become a field in its ownright but, as a result, has become partially cut off from clinical,personality, physiological, and social psychology and from biol-ogy. Developmental psychology has focused largely on changes
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with age and on group averages, but we need also to understandindividuals, the primary concern of much clinical and personal-ity psychology. Physiological analysis leads to functions ofparts, and although individuals function as wholes, that func-tioning depends on, but cannot be entirely explained by, pro-cesses within parts. And physiological analysis can aid behav-ioral understanding. A recent example is the manner in whichRosenblatt's (1991) survey of the physiology of parturitionposes new questions about the onset of maternal responsive-ness. Social psychology is concerned largely with group phe-nomena, and developmentalists—knowing that children growup in groups, that relationships are crucial to their develop-ment, and that values, expectations, and hopes held by thechild and others shape development—need social psychologi-cal expertise. And ethology, as we shall see, can contribute prin-ciples and perspectives of importance to developmental psy-chologists.
We have here demands that could conflict: science proceedsby analysis, but one needs synthesis and the study of wholes aswell; one needs to specialize, but that means studying onlyparts of a whole; one needs to describe phenomena, but onealso needs to understand process; one needs concepts to copewith intangibles, but one must not lose discipline. It would befolly to suggest that these problems can be readily solved, butthe following sections address a series of relevant and interre-lated issues.
There are three main themes. The first concerns the need tofocus not only on individuals, but also on individuals in a net-work of relationships, and this in turn requires us both to distin-guish levels of social complexity and to come to terms with thedialectical relations between them. The second is that descrip-tion is a necessary first step, but can never be perfect. Ourcategories and concepts are essential heuristically but are neverabsolute, because we have at present no entirely satisfactory wayof coping with entities that are both isolatable and intercon-nected and mutually influence each other. The third is the needto integrate developmental psychology with other disciplines.Here, because of my own biases, I refer especially to ethology,though I am aware that some of the ideas I ascribe to ethologyalso had other roots.
Levels of Complexity
Children grow up in a network of relationships and usuallywithin families, which form parts of larger groups. It is thusnecessary to come to terms with a series of levels of socialcomplexity: physiological and psychological systems, individ-uals, short-term interactions between individuals, relationshipsinvolving a succession of interactions between two individualsknown to each other, groups, and societies (Figure 1). Each ofthese levels has properties not relevant to lower levels, and ateach level new descriptive and explanatory concepts areneeded. For instance, we may describe the behavior of twoindividuals in an interaction as "meshing" well, but meshing isa concept irrelevant to the behavior of an individual in isola-tion. Furthermore, each level affects and is affected by otherlevels. Thus the course of an interaction depends both on thenatures of the participating individuals and on the relationshipof which it forms a part, and the nature of a relationship is
influenced both by the component interactions and by thegroup in which it is embedded. Furthermore, each of theselevels influences, and is influenced by, the physical environ-ment and by the sociocultural structure of ideas, values, myths,beliefs, institutions with their constituent roles, and so on,more or less shared by the individuals in the relationship,group, or society in question.
Recognition of these levels is in no way an argument for unidi-rectional reductionism, because the dialectical relations be-tween levels are crucial (cf. Fentress, 1991). Each level, includ-ing that of the individual, must be thought of not as an entitybut rather in terms of processes continually influenced by thedialectical relations between levels (Hinde, 1987,199 la). It willbe apparent that such an approach always demands liaison be-tween a variety of disciplines.
Each level, as well as the sociocultural structure, has bothobjective and subjective aspects. For example, relationshipshave objective aspects that are apparent to an outside observerand subjective aspects that are specific to each participant,known in their entirety only to him or her, and shared onlypartially. Similarly, the objective aspects of the socioculturalstructure may be partially codified in laws and customs, butthe subjective aspects may be subtly different for each indi-vidual.
The position taken here is not so extreme as that of some whoespouse dialectical determinism (review Hopkins & Butter-worth, 1990). It is of course basic that development must bestudied at several levels simultaneously and that stability is, ifnot always momentary, at least dynamic. But though emphasiz-ing process, 1 would argue that the view that organism andenvironment are inseparable is not helpful. Although the diffi-culties of boundary definition matter and must be borne inmind, the essential thing is to come to terms with the continu-ous interplay (e.g, Markova, 1990; Mead, 1934). And while re-jecting linear causal chains, I would stop short of saying thatdevelopment can never be adequately predicted on the basis ofindividual elements, although that perhaps reflects an aspira-tion rather than an achievable goal.
Description
How can one cope with multiple levels of analysis simulta-neously? How can one nail down entities constituted by continu-ous dynamic processes? Description and categorization areclearly necessary as a preliminary to—or as a part of (Carey,1990)—analysis, but in describing such phenomena one inevita-bly simplifies the complexity of real life. A delicate balancemust be struck between using categories and concepts that onecan handle and distorting nature. And that one is compromis-ing must not be forgotten.
This is a lesson that is being learned slowly by ethologists. Forexample, the early concept of the Fixed Action Pattern (FAP),used to refer to a species characteristic movement pattern,seemed clearcut. Gradually, it became apparent that all FAPswere variable, and the concept became replaced with that of theModal Action Pattern (Barlow, 1977). Similar issues arise inchild development. In studies of preschoolers, "aggressive be-havior" seemed a clearcut category, but experience soonshowed that the category boundaries are hard to define and
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SOCIETY
SOCIO-CULTURALSTRUCTURE
INTERACTION
INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOUR
PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS
Figure 1. The dialectical relations between successive levels of social complexity.
PHYSICALENVIRONMENT
that the category is itself heterogeneous. But subdivision metsimilar problems. The subcategories into which it is usuallydivided (e.g., instrumental aggression and teasing aggression[Feshbach, 1970]) themselves have shady boundaries. It isnearer the truth (though not necessarily facilitatory of research)to recognize that aggressive acts involve other behavioral sys-tems—for instance, tendencies to acquire objects (flcquisitive-ness) or status (assertivenesty—and that the nature of the aggres-sion shown depends on interactions between these systems (Fig-
Aggressiveness
Acquisitiveness
Assertiveness
Figure 2. Model of the relations among three propensities and ag-gressive behavior. (Aggression would be shown if the current state wererepresented by a point above the striped surface.)
ure 2). As another example, Stevenson-Hinde (1991) has arguedthat although fear behavior and attachment behavior are to bethought of as discrete behavioral systems, "the postulation ofdiscrete behavioural systems should not obscure relations be-tween them. Activation of a fear behaviour system may lead toactivation of an attachment behaviour system" (pp. 325-326)and activation of the attachment behavior system may inhibitthe fear.
This tendency for systems to change their state or even theirproperties according to the broader context within which theyare operating has been repeatedly stressed by Fentress (e.g.,1991). For instance, at a lower level of analysis, Getting andDekin (1985) have shown that the neural networks operative inthe swimming of the mollusc Tritonia are reconfigured intodifferent functional circuits according to the behavioral state ofthe animal and that the neurones involved cannot be clearlycategorized as motor neurones, central pattern generators, andso forth. And at higher levels of social complexity, relationshipsor families may change their characteristics with the context.Fentress sees the difficulties in understanding behavior anddevelopment as stemming in large part from the difficulty ofcomprehending that, at all levels of complexity, systems mustbe both self-organizing and interactive with other systems."Varying forms of behavioural taxonomy clarify certain proper-ties of expression while potentially obscuring others. Unitary'boxes connected by arrows' taxonomies often do not work, inpart because they too easily draw our attention away from theproperties of the arrows that in turn may affect the propertiesof the boxes" (Fentress, 1991, p. 98).
From this perspective, it is not surprising that individualsbehave differently in different social contexts. Stevenson-Hinde (1986) has pointed out that so-called "child characteris-tics" refer to characteristics that lie on a continuum from indi-
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vidual characteristics to relationship or situation characteris-tics, with height and weight but few if any psychological charac-teristics at the individual end, temperament dimensions closeto but at varying distances from it, and attachment categoriesnear the relationship end.
It is possible that we should view some age changes in thesame way. We are accustomed to the concept of "age-appro-priate behavior," ascribing underlying similarities across ages to"heterotypic continuity" (Kagan, 1971) and the changes tochanges in the system concerned, but they could also be causedby changes in relations with other systems. For example, digitspan increases between infancy and adulthood, but the evi-dence indicates that memory span remains constant afterabout age 4, the changes being caused by a domain-specificincrease in knowledge about the materials (Carey, 1990).
Because of this lability in the elements and in the relationsbetween elements, every generalization should be accompa-nied by a statement of its limitations—a requirement thatmakes description of both behavior and context even more nec-essary. As an example of the importance of this, Radke-Yarrow,Richters, and Wilson (1988) found that higher rates of initialchild compliance were related to more positive mother-childrelationships only in families categorized as "stable," and ma-ternal use of harsh enforcement was associated with more nega-tive mother-child relationships only in "chaotic" families.Again, Stevenson-Hinde and Shouldice (1990) found thatmothers of securely attached children tended to overestimatetheir children's shyness, whereas mothers of insecurely attachedchildren tended to underestimate.
Therefore, we must recognize that description and classifica-tion nearly always involve trying to push nature into pigeonholes when the fit is by no means perfect and that, for psycholo-gists, description must embrace the several levels of social com-plexity.
Developmental psychology, concerned with what children door can do at different ages, has not neglected description, but itis worth emphasizing two issues. First, at the behavioral level,there are two routes to description: (a) one that refers ultimatelyto patterns of muscular contraction, and (b) one that refers tothe consequences of action or the meanings behind action.Each has its uses and advantages (Hinde, 1966). Taking a leadfrom studies of lower species, such as fish, some researchers(e.g., Blurton Jones, 1972) have attempted to describe children'sbehavior by focusing solely on the former route. However, chil-dren are not fish, and such attempts have proved on the wholesterile. Better ways for describing children's behavior, which donot assume that behavior is all we are interested in and takeaccount of the meanings behind actions, are available (e.g.,Caldwell, 1969; Lytton, 1973).
Second, description is necessary at each level of social com-plexity, and the more complex the phenomenon, the more se-lective description must be. A special problem arises in thedescription of relationships (and higher order phenomena). De-velopmental psychologists normally study interactions, for in-stance, studying mother-child play across a number of dyadsand making generalizations across dyads. Relationships involvea number of types of interaction and cannot be described fromgeneralizations across dyads about interactions, because thedifferent interactions within each relationship affect each
Interactions approach
Dyad
A – B
C – D
E – F
A – B
C – D
E – F
Relationships
Dyad
Interaction type
X S > Generalization
J
Y > > Generalization
J
approach
Interaction type
A – B X-"|
A – B Y > Generalization
A – B zJ
C – D
C – D
C – D
Y > > General izat ion
Figure 3. The contrast between achieving generalizations aboutinteractions and generalizations about relationships.
other. Rather, each relationship must be described, and onlythen can generalizations be made across dyads (Figure 3).
Attachment theory involves a procedure for categorizingsome aspects of mother-child relationships (Ainsworth, Blehar,Waters, & Wall, 1978; Cassidy & Marvin, 1989). A means forclassifying other characteristics of relationships is given byHinde (1979,1991a).
Relations Between Levels
Even though analysis tends to move from more complex lev-els to less, the importance of crossing and recrossing in bothdirections cannot be overestimated. The relations between lev-els of social complexity are well established in studies of physiol-ogy and behavior (e.g., Andrew, 1991; Horn, 1991; Hutchison,1991), but they are equally important in developmental studies.It is not only that similar principles of organization may berepeated at different levels, it is also necessary to trace causalrelations between them.
Both the experiences a child has in interactions with othersand the effects of those experiences on the child himself orherself depend on his or her nature. Those interactions willaffect and be affected by the relationships of which they formpart, and those relationships are similarly related to the familyor group. Each of these levels may also be affected by the socio-cultural structure, by the myths and values current in the fam-ily, group, or society. Thus we need to come to terms with thedialectical relations between levels.
Consider, as an example, the genesis of a fear of snakes. Chil-dren brought up in an institution who have never seen a snake
1022 ROBERT A. HINDE
show little fear if they first encounter one at 30 months, but theyavoid a snake crawling on the ground from about 3 years(Prechtl, 1950). Children also show spontaneous fears of otherobjects or situations that might have posed a real threat in hu-man's environment of evolutionary adaptedness, such asspiders, heights, darkness, and being alone. Humans are muchless prone to develop spontaneous fears of other situations thatare genuinely lethal in modern society but that were not presentearlier in evolutionary history, such as cars or bombs (Marks,1987). It is thus not unreasonable to suppose that a propensityto fear, or to learn to fear, snakes is part of the human biologicalheritage.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the extent of the fear ismuch influenced by social referencing. The child looks atothers, and especially at a trusted other, and imitates their re-sponse (Emde, 1980; Klinnert, Campos, Sorce, Emde, &Svedja, 1983). Comparative evidence provides strong supportfor this view thus: (a) Wild-reared rhesus monkeys tested in thelaboratory nearly always show fear of snakes; (b) laboratory-reared monkeys do not show fear of snakes; (c) laboratory-reared monkeys shown a videotape of a wild-reared monkeyshowing fear of a snake become afraid of snakes thereafter; and(d) laboratory-reared monkeys shown a "doctored" videotape ofa wild-reared monkey apparently showing fear of a flower donot become afraid of either flowers or snakes (Mineka, 1987).There is thus clear evidence that rhesus monkeys have a pro-pensity to fear snakes that depends for its full realization on theexperience of seeing others respond fearfully to snakes. This inturn increases the plausibility of a similar explanation of snakefears in humans.
Some individuals develop snake phobias, showing a fear ofsnakes out of all proportion to the threat they present, a fearthat is irrational and is beyond voluntary control. It is reason-able to suggest that the role of snakes as a symbol in our cultureis related to these issues. Snakes play an important part, andhave played an even more important part, in our mythology. Inthe myth of the garden of Eden, in the Rubens paintings ofsnakes gnawing at the genitals of those cast down into Hell,snakes symbolize evil. Therefore, if we are really to understandfear of snakes and the symbolic role of snakes, we must come toterms with a series of dialectical relations among the propensity
Fear of Snakes
Snake Myths Behaviour ofcaregiver
Propensity tofear snakes
.Snake fear& phobias
Figure 4. The genesis of fear of snakes.
to fear snakes, social referencing within relationships, andsnake myths within the sociocultural structure (see Figure 4 andfurther discussion in Hinde, 1991a).
Let us consider a very different example that also suggestscomplex links between the levels of social complexity. In astudy of families in a research apartment in Bethesda, Mary-land, Radke-Yarrow et al. (1988) found the following: (a) Therewas a high level of concordance in negative affect between themembers of mother-child dyads, indicating strong interdepen-dence within the dyad, (b) In families in which the mother-younger child were concordant in negativity, both mother-older child relationships and sibling relationships tended alsoto be concordant, (c) Mothers showed more negative affect infamilies of low socioeconomic (SES) status. When the instabil-ity and unpredictability of life circumstances in the familieswere examined, it appeared that the link between low SES andmaternal negative affect was primarily due to the corrosivehardship of unpredictability and disorganization, (d) As men-tioned earlier, the relations between indices of maternal controlinteractions and the nature of the mother-child relationshipvaried with family stability. Thus higher rates of child compli-ance were related to more positive mother-child relationshipsonly in stable families, and maternal use of harsh enforcementwas related to more negative mother-child relationships only inmore negative ones, (e) The relation between child characteris-tics and the mother-child relationship differed according tothe sex of the child. Thus shy girls had more positive relation-ships with their mothers than nonshy girls, whereas shy boyshad worse relationships than nonshy boys. Radke-Yarrow et al.ascribed this difference to other child characteristics associatedwith shyness. A very similar finding in Britain by Simpson andStevenson-Hinde (1985) was ascribed to maternal values: Mac-coby and Sants (personal communication) showed that Califor-nian mothers like little girls to be shy and little boys not to be.Although these data were cross-sectional, they strongly suggestinfluences among individual characteristics, relationships, fam-ily characteristics, and the sociocultural structure of beliefs andvalues. Dunn's (1991) important studies of sibling relationshipswithin the family led to a similar conclusion.
Not clearly demonstrated by these data, but important in thelong run, are influences up the levels of complexity. The natureof the family depends on those of the family members and ontheir relationships, and the values and beliefs of a society stemultimately from processes in individuals.
Nature-Nurture: Relatively Stable Characters,Constraints on Learning
For logistical reasons, every study in developmental psychol-ogy has limits. One cannot trace all the dialectical relationsshown in Figure 1 in every investigation. A starting point istherefore needed. Can one identify simple items or propertiesof behavior that can fill this role? The previous discussion ofthe difficulties of describing behavior indicates that one mustbe content with approximations, with categories heuristicallyuseful but shady at the edges.
A false start involved the view that behavior or propensitiescould be divided into those that are innate and those that arelearned or otherwise acquired. Although this error has long
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been recognized (Bateson, 199 la, 1991b; Oyama, 1985), it stillpersists. Development involves an interplay between the indi-vidual and the environment. The current state of the individualinfluences which genes are expressed, and individuals influ-ence and change the world they encounter. At the present timetwin and adoption studies are providing new insights into theinteractions between genetic and environmental factors in de-velopment (e.g., Plomin & de Fries, 1983; Scarr & Kidd, 1983).
Although the dichotomy of innate versus learned behavior isfalse, it is possible to arrange characters along a continuumfrom those that are relatively stable with respect to environmen-tal influence to those that are relatively labile (Barlow, 1989;Hinde, 1966,1991a). Thus there are some characters that ap-pear in virtually the whole range of environments in which lifeis possible ("stable" characters): either the processes involved intheir development are so regulated that they appear over a widerange of experiential influences, or the factors relevant to theirdevelopment are ubiquitous. By contrast, characters at the la-bile end of the continuum appear only over a narrow range ofconditions. It will be noted that this formulation differs fromthe innate-learned dichotomy in that (a) it involves a contin-uum and (b) a characteristic may be influenced by experiencebut yet is stable because the relevant influences lack specificityor are ubiquitous. However, the level of analysis at which thecharacter is denned may be crucial. Thus the broad details ofthe motor pattern of smiling form a stable human characteris-tic, yet its fine details and the circumstances in which it is givenare labile. Furthermore, development may be stable up to acertain point and labile thereafter, or labile first and stablelater.
For some (but not all) problems such relatively stable charac-ters can provide us with starting points, provided, however, thatwe remember that they will be subject to variation. It is imprac-ticable to make a list of such characters, partly because a list ofmundane characters would be tedious, and partly because thecross-cultural data are not adequate to prove cross-cultural sta-bility for any characters. However, they might include aspects ofperception, motor patterns, stimulus responsiveness, motiva-tion, cognitive processes, predispositions to learn (includingthe capacity for language), and so on (see Hinde, 199la).
Of course, each such "relatively stable" character itself poses adevelopmental problem. Because the degree to which genes areexpressed may depend on the environment, and because suscep-tibility to the environment may depend on the genetic constitu-tion, the constraints on their variability themselves involve aninterplay between genetic and environmental influences. Thesame is true for subsequent development.
The importance of constraints on learning and predisposi-tions to learn must be emphasized here (Hinde & Stevenson-Hinde, 1973; Seligman & Hager, 1972). The earlier work on thissubject concerned animals, where cross-species comparisonsthrew genetic constraints on development into relief. For in-stance, the chaffinch (a small bird) has to learn its song, but itwill learn only songs with a note structure similar to the spe-cies-characteristic song. The bullfinch learns preferentially thesong its father (biological or adoptive) sang (Thorpe, 1961).Even the capacity to acquire individual distinctiveness in sing-ing behavior, essentially creative in nature, is to be seen in thislight (Marler, 1991).
Humans as a species presumably also have similar con-straints, though we recognize them only in the observation thatsome tasks or experiences are difficult to learn. Indeed it can beagreed that efficient learning requires inbuilt constraints (John-son-Laird, 1990). Within the human species, similar con-straints probably operate in autism. Autism is known to havegenetic "bases" and involves specific deficits in understandingof emotion caused by beliefs (Baron-Cohen, 1991). It has alsobeen suggested that male and female humans differ in theirpredispositions to learn (Hinde, 1987).
Constraints or predispositions may equally well be environ-mental in origin in both animals (Bateson, 1987; Gottlieb,1991) and humans (e.g., Butterworth & Bryant, 1990; Sameroff& Chandler, 1975). Insofar as an individual is what he or she isas a consequence of prior experience, and future developmentdepends on current state, all development is channeled by expe-rience.
Relationships and Individuals
The critical question for the developmental psychologist ishow individual characteristics are affected by the relationshipsexperienced. Strong associations between parenting practicesand child characteristics, involving social behavior (e.g.,Baumrind, 1971; Bretherton, 1985; Maccoby & Martin, 1983),affective behavior (e.g., Easterbrooks & Emde, 1988; Radke-Yarrow et al., 1988), and cognitive dimensions (e.g., Goswami &Bryant, 1990) have been demonstrated, and although it must beassumed that influences operate both ways, in at least somecases there is an effect of parenting practices on the child.
But the issues are not simple. First, some individual charac-teristics may be influenced by relationships more than others,and the extent to which any one characteristic is affected maychange during development. Thus the propensity to show fearmay be relatively independent of relationships from 0 to 6months, subsequently modified by relationships and reinforce-ment, and later still become relatively fixed (Stevenson-Hinde,1988).
Second, in the case of relatives, and especially parents, it is byno means easy to distinguish genetic from experiential influ-ences. First, similarities in genetic constitution may predisposethe child to respond to environmental events similarly to, forexample, the parents. Second, similarities in genetic constitu-tion may cause the child to select or create an environmentsimilar to that to which the parents preferentially respond.Third, parents may be predisposed genetically to provide theirchildren with an environment conducive to the development ofparticular characteristics. For example, shy parents may bothpass on genes associated with a predisposition to develop abehavioral style that might be labeled as shy and create an envi-ronment in which their children saw few strangers. Finally, par-ents and others may react differently to children of differentgenotypes (e.g., Jaspers & Leeuw, 1980; Plomin, 1986; Plomin &de Fries, 1983; Scarr & McCartney, 1983).
With regard to the processes whereby interactions within re-lationships have long-term effects on child behavior, until re-cently most work focused on reinforcement and modeling.Current interest centers on possible cognitive intermediariesbetween attachment relationships and subsequent interactions.
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The quality of the child's attachment relationship with themother predicts the character of later peer interactions (e.g.,Sroufe, 1983; Sroufe & Fleeson, 1986; Turner, 1991), suggestingthat it affects some aspects of the child. Bowlby (1969), taking alead from Craik (1943), postulated that the child forms internalworking models of self, of others, and of their relationships.During the last decade, this idea has achieved increasing promi-nence. Initially, although heuristically useful, it was too ill-de-fined to serve as a scientific concept (cf. MacCorquodale &Meehl, 1954). For instance Main, Kaplan, and Cassidy (1985, p.68) described it as "a mental representation of an aspect of theworld, others, self, or relationships to others that is of specialrelevance to the individual," and elsewhere as "a set ofconscious and/or unconscious rules for the organization of in-formation." In this and other articles, additional propertieswere ascribed to the concept, many of which were isomorphicwith the phenomena they were seeking to explain (Hinde,1989a). Furthermore, there were both methodological and con-ceptual differences in the way in which the concept was used bydifferent workers (Crittenden, 1990). Now, however, the con-cept of internal working model is in an exciting stage of develop-ment, involving inputs from work on cognition by both cogni-tive psychologists (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1983,1990) and develop-mental psychologists/psychiatrists (e.g., Stern, 1985, 1991).Bretherton (1990) conceptualized internal working models assystems of hierarchically organized schemata, with the modelsof self, others, and the world interlinked and mutually influenc-ing each other (cf. Fentress, 1991). Used in this way, the conceptis becoming more than a useful metaphor and is able to inte-grate data on psychopathology, the transmission of patterns ofparenting across generations, the relations between communi-cation within attachment relationships and communicationabout such relationships to third parties.
Effects of Relationships on Relationships
A child grows up in a network of relationships, and the dif-ferent relationships may affect each other (Hinde & Stevenson-Hinde, 1988a, 1988b). The influence of relationships on rela-tionships has been of interest to three groups of workers. Pri-matologists have come to recognize that relationships affectrelationships within primate groups and, with observationaland experimental evidence, that the mother-infant relationshipis crucially affected by others (Hinde, 1972,1983). Child devel-opmentalists have demonstrated that the quality of a particularrelationship in the family may be related to that of another. Forinstance, the marital relationship may be related to the mother-child relationship (Christensen & Margolin, 1988; Easter-brooks & Emde, 1988; Engfer, 1988; Meyer, 1988), the mother-child relationship may be related to the sibling relationship(Dunn, 1988a, 1988b), divorce may have long-term sequelae forthe children (Hetherington, 1988; see also Rutter, 1988), andeffects of inadequate parenting may be transmitted across gen-erations (Belsky & Pensky, 1988; Caspi & Elder, 1988; Gross-man, Fremmer-Bombik, Rudolph, & Grossman, 1988; Patter-son & Dishion, 1988). Some of the mechanisms involved aresummarized by Hinde and Stevenson-Hinde (1988b).
A third group concerned with the effects of relationships onrelationships has been the family systems theorists. Although
there are many points of contact between them and develop-mental psychologists working on similar problems (P. Minu-chin, 1985), the family systems theorists (themselves diverse)have developed a rather distinctive orientation and vocabulary.They emphasize the family as an open system, with organizedpatterns of interaction that are circular in form. The familysystem has homeostatic features that maintain the stability ofthe patterns within it, but may periodically undergo perturba-tions requiring a reorganization of patterns. The individualsconstituting the family are seen as interdependent and distrib-uted across subsystems which have their own integrity andwhose interactions are governed by implicit rules and bound-aries (e.g., P. Minuchin, 1988).
It will be apparent that many of the properties emphasizedby family systems theorists are compatible with the interdepen-dent yet self-organizing systems whose importance is empha-sized by Fentress (1991) at lower levels of analysis (see earlierdiscussion). It is important to recognize that the family as awhole can have properties with some degree of independencefrom the behavior of its component units—analogous (only) toHoyle's (1964) finding at a quite different level that the regularstepping movements of insects are not accompanied by fixedpatterns of electrical activity in the motor neurones. Further-more, the concepts of family systems theorists are clearly po-tentially compatible with the dialectical relations between lev-els shown in Figure 1.
My own view is that the level of dyadic relationships meritsspecial attention for developmental psychologists, in that it isby interactions within relationships that development is af-fected. From there it is possible to assess how interactions andrelationships are affected by third parties (e.g., Clarke-Stewart,1978; Corter, Abramovitch, & Pepler, 1983; Barrett & Hinde,1988), other relationships, and the sociocultural structure. Tofoster further links between family systems theorists and devel-opmental psychologists, it would be desirable to clear up a fewconceptual issues (Hinde, 1989b). For instance:
1. Family systems theorists emphasize the family as an "orga-nized whole" and ascribe to it homeostatic properties. But themaintenance of the family as a functioning unit depends on thebehavior of individuals within their relationships. Family orga-nization may derive either from personal goal seeking—inwhich individuals attempt to create a family that suits their ownpersonal needs, and the resulting pattern of relationships is aconsequence but not a goal of the behavior of individuals—aswell as from interpersonal goal seeking, involving efforts tomake the constituent relationships conform to an ideal or de-sired pattern. In both cases, the goals may be unconscious orloosely defined. In any case, the processes that contribute tostability are diverse and may reside in one or more individualsor relationships. And it may involve attempts to approach anequilibrium or goal state whatever the current state, to ap-proach it only so long as the current state remains within cer-tain limits, or to avoid an undesirable state.
2. The same individual may belong to more than one subsys-tem. Thus the mother is part of both the spouse and themother-child subsystem. An advantage of this subsystem ap-proach is that it permits description of separate patterns fordifferent subsystems composed of the same people (e.g.,spouses are also parents). An advantage of the relationships
APA CENTENNIAL: INTEGRATING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 1025
approach advocated here is that it calls attention to the effectsof interactions on interactions within a relationship and be-tween relationships, so that a mother's marriage may affect (orbe affected by) the mother-child relationship. But there is aclear need for an unambiguous definition of the subsystem con-cept. For instance, does the concept have a subjective reality forthe participants? If it does, how does it differ from relation-ships? If it does not, as would appear to be the case with the"three generational subsystem" postulated by P. Minuchin(1985), is its reality confined to the mind of the therapist?
3. Some family therapists downplay the role of the individ-ual so far as to hold that attempts "to quantify the relative inputof members of a system" do not make sense in a systems frame-work (P. Minuchin, 1985, p. 300). Developmental psychologistsmay disagree, especially if the questions asked are concernedwith changes in or differences between relationships or familiesand are carefully phrased (Hinde, 1979).
4. Earlier, the importance of distinguishing between the ob-jective and the subjective reality of aspects of the socioculturalstructure was noted. This distinction could be important tofamily systems theorists. Are family tasks, family myths, andfamily style descriptive concepts useful to the therapist, or arethey (consciously or unconsciously) part of the perceptions ofthe participants, and thereby influencing process? And the fam-ily world view, concerned with the family's self-perceptions, maybe shared by family members, but there may also be markeddifferences between family members in the way they perceivethe family.
These somewhat academic points are perhaps tangential tothe clinical achievements of the family systems approach andare intended only to supplement the important efforts made byP. Minuchin (1985) and others to bridge the gap between clini-cians and developmentalists. In my own view, the means bywhich relationships affect relationships pose crucial problemsfor developmental psychology.
Individual Differences
Developmental psychology's successes would have been im-possible without the use of statistical techniques. Nevertheless,their widespread and proper use has resulted in a focus ongroup means and a neglect of individual differences, althoughit is often differences that help us understand processes (Dunn,1991; Rutter, 1991). Furthermore, a neglect of individual differ-ences can lessen the value of the data to the clinician who isattempting to deal with individual cases. The advantages of acase study approach have recently been described forcefully byRadke-Yarrow (1991): for example, bringing balance to re-search dominated by group or variable-oriented research andgreater understanding of the relations between behavioral sys-tems; light thrown on children at the extremes and on childrenwho show resilience in adverse circumstances or who fail infavorable ones; and the sharpening up of data on turning pointsin development usually obscured by group variance, thus per-mitting process to be studied more directly. To the biologist,individual differences raise the further question as to whetherthey merely represent noise in the system or whether they areadaptive: some examples of the application of this approach tochildren are given in a later section.
As Radke-Yarrow (1991) pointed out, a revival of interest inindividual case studies is a recent phenomenon, and statisticaltechniques for dealing with multiple levels of data on few indi-viduals are at present poorly developed (but see D. H. Barlow &Hersen, 1984; Kazdin, 1982). Although this certainly does notmean that case studies should not be pursued, there is anotherapproach that could take us some of the way. Statistical tech-niques that rely on linear correlational procedures can be mis-leading, and for many purposes it is preferable to attempt tocategorize children (Hinde & Dennis, 1986). Examination ofthose children who appear to be exceptions to the initial catego-rization can lead one to new generalizations. Iteration of such aprocedure can approach the individual.
An example that goes some of the way toward this goal isshown in Figure 5, which plots an index of maternal warmthagainst maternal strong control in 4-year-olds. The children arecategorized according to whether they were in the top third,middle third, or bottom third on aggression in preschools. Inthree replications, aggression was found to be lower when con-trol and warmth were more or less in balance, that is, in thecentral area, termed authoritative after Baumrind (1971), thanin the authoritarian, permissive, or indulgent areas. This ofcourse does not necessarily mean that the dimensions plottedwere the crucial ones: in fact, the mother-child relationshipsdiffered between areas in many dimensions in addition towarmth and control. But there were a few high aggressives inthe authoritative area and a few low aggressives in the others.These exceptions were found to differ from other individuals inthe same area on some of these other aspects of the mother-child relationship. If the sample size were adequate this proce-dure could be iterated to approach the individual level.
Links With Ethology
Many developmental psychologists imagine that any inputbiology/ethology might have concerns parallels between ani-mal and human behavior. Of course, parallels can be found,especially in relatively simple patterns—for instance, in rootingbehavior and the Moro reflex. Some human expressive move-ments can be traced back to prehuman forms (e.g., Eibl-Eibes-feldt, 1975; van Hooff, 1972). But anthropomorphism is danger-ous, and parallels can be misleading. In some cases they arerevealing only if one finds the right level of analysis. For exam-ple, behavioral development is disturbed by separating infantfrom mother for a week or two in both rhesus monkeys andhumans. However, the evidence indicates that human childrenare more disturbed if they are away from home in a strangeplace during the separation period, whereas rhesus monkeysare more upset if they stay in the familiar group environmentand the mother goes away. The difference seems to be that, inrhesus monkeys, the mother-infant relationship is more dis-turbed under the latter conditions, because the mother has toreestablish her relationships with her group companions whenshe returns as well as to cope with her demanding infant. Whatis common between monkeys and humans is that the more themother-infant relationship is disrupted, the more the infant isdisturbed (Hinde & McGinnis, 1977; cf. Rutter, 1991).
As this last example shows, rather than simple parallels, oneshould look for principles abstracted from animal data whose
1026 ROBERT A. HINDE
oo
O
Authoritarian
I
Indulgent
-1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1
Maternal warmth
1.5
Figure 5. Relations between maternal warmth and maternal control at home, and the aggression shownby 4-year-olds in preschool. (The children are categorized according to whether they were in the top third[circled crosses], middle third [open circles], or bottom third [filled circles] on aggression.)
applicability to the human species can be tested. A classic ex-ample is Bowlby's (1969) use of Harlow's data on rhesus mon-keys (Harlow & Zimmerman, 1959) to show that contact com-fort, and not just food reinforcement as had previously beensupposed, was crucial in the mother-child relationship.
Ethologists, unlike developmental psychologists, have em-phasized that full understanding of a structure or behavior de-mands answers to four distinct questions. Thus the question"Why does the thumb move in a different way from thefingers?" could be answered developmentally (the growth ofdigit rudiments and nerve fibres), causally (the structure ofbones, muscles, and nerves), functionally (the thumb's role ingrasping, etc.), or in terms of evolution (the human species'monkeylike ancestors presumably had similar thumbs). Theimportance of the last two questions has been overemphasizedby some sociobiologists and neglected by most developmentalpsychologists. However, such issues can make a not inconsider-able contribution to understanding child development.
First, they have implications for practice. Thus the findingthat, across mammals, the frequency of suckling is inverselyrelated to the concentration of the milk and that humans haverelatively dilute milk was a strong argument against schedulefeeding (Blurton-Jones, 1972). The studies of Klaus and Ken-nell (1976; Kennell, 1986) showing that allowing mothers tohave immediate postpartum contact with their infants has atleast short-term (but not necessarily long-term [Fleming &Corter, 1988]) beneficial effects were influenced by compara-tive functional considerations. And, at a more theoretical level,Bowlby (1969) cast new light on the so-called "irrational fearsof childhood" (fears of darkness, falling, being left alone, etc.)by arguing that they would have been functional in our environ-ment of evolutionary adaptedness.
Second, diverse facts about human behavior, which appearinitially to be isolated and independent, can be integrated froman evolutionary perspective. Thus various aspects of the
mother-infant relationship are seen to form a functional wholewhen seen against the probable sociosexual arrangements inour environment of evolutionary adaptedness (Hinde, 1984).
Third, the links between situations and outcomes can some-times be understood in functional terms. For example, infanti-cide and voluntary abortion are more common when the infantis not the putative parents' own, the infant has poor reproduc-tive potential, or circumstances are adverse and reproductiveeffort might be wasted. If the incidence of infanticide or abor-tion is taken as an indicator of parental motivation, the data arein harmony with the view that motivation is low when furtherparental investment in the current offspring might decrease themother's long-term reproductive success (Daly & Wilson,1984).
It has even been suggested that behavior that seems maladap-tive in our society may have been functional in others. Thus DeVries (1984) found that children with a "difficult" temperamentwere more likely to survive famine, perhaps because they weremore demanding. Similarly, Main and Weston (1982) suggestedthat the behavior of infants whose relationships with theirmothers were avoidant permitted the maintenance of organiza-tion, control, and flexibility with mothers who do not welcomephysical contact and who are restricted in emotional expression(see also Egeland & Farber, 1984). It has also been suggestedthat the relations between early family relationships and subse-quent personality or behavioral characteristics are adaptive(Belsky, Steinberg, & Draper, 1991; Hinde, 1986, 1991b), al-though the evidence is far from secure.
A fourth possible payoff from an evolutionary-functionalapproach is that our changing adjustment to our changing cul-ture could be greatly facilitated by an understanding of wherewe started. This does not imply that there are human character-istics that are independent of culture, but rather that it is helpfulto distinguish biological desiderata, resulting from natural se-lection in our environment of evolutionary adaptedness, from
APA CENTENNIAL: INTEGRATING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 1027
the desiderata of our particular culture, and to consider therelations of each to the psychological desideratum of mentalhealth (Hinde & Stevenson-Hinde, 1990).
Conclusion
My plea, therefore, is for a truly multidisciplinary approachthat focuses on the dialectical relations between levels of socialcomplexity and, most particularly, on those relations amongthe individual, interactions, and relationships. Such an ap-proach requires not only a descriptive base but also recognitionthat description can never be precise, and that both descriptiveand explanatory concepts are concerned with entities that areinterconnected and mutually influence each other.
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Received October 4,1991Accepted June 16,1992 •
